Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks
Internal Obstacles for Reform in Lebanon
Published: Monday 25 January 2010 Updated: Monday 25 January 2010
The Lebanese executive branch is subject to far too many restraints to be in the position to deliver major reforms. Its main task can only be that of tackling its internal critics and foreign enemies while guaranteeing minimal standards of stability to the country.
The formation of a national unity government in Lebanon was the result of a long period of negotiations, establishing a fragile balance that could be shaken by a number of factors. Saad Hariri managed to form an executive branch relying on a power sharing formula characterized by a quota of ministerial positions under the sphere of influence of the president. This compromise allowed the leader of the March 14 coalition to avoid having a third of his government nominated by the opposition—effectively giving the opposition a veto power over the decisions of the new executive. Nevertheless, the opposition remains strong—represented in the government by ten ministers, including key positions such as the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Telecommunications and Energy.
The stability of the Lebanese government ia subject to several internal restraints that, in all likelihood, will frustrate attempts to bring about major changes. As a matter of fact, any major reform such as the abolition of the sectarian system, the reform of the electoral law or the recognition of extended rights to the local Palestinian population will easily prompt an escalation in tension most likely ending in violence.
More specifically, the distancing of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt from the March 14 coalition speaks to the internal tensions of the country, becoming a further variable of instability and weakening the majority. The repositioning of Jumblatt within the political scene has been explained by analysts as a result of the renewed importance of Damascus as a leading regional actor. A fact that became evident with Saudi brokered official visit of Prime Minister Hariri to Syria held a few days after the parliament confidence vote to the executive in an effort to normalize Lebanese-Syrian relations.
On the internal front, another problem for Hariri is the discontent of the Christian faction towards his concessions to the opposition. The Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces were not completely satisfied with their ministerial share. They are concerned over the increasing importance of the Christian faction in the opposition, lead by Michel Aoun, which adopted an intransigent approach to the negotiations preceding the formation of the present cabinet. March 14 Christians were also the most outspoken opponents to the adoption of Article 6 of the Ministerial Policy Statement in which the resistance was legitimized as a Lebanese right. On this point the opposition, and especially Hezbollah, would have not accepted compromises, and article six facilitated the confidence of the parliament on the 10 of December.
But this latter issue is another serious challenge for the present executive. The recognition of the legitimacy of the resistance, which allows Hezbollah to maintain its military and security apparatus, may provoke Israel—especially if Israeli attack against Iran were to entail the neutralization of Hezbollah. This scenario would inevitably lead to dramatic consequences for Lebanon. The relatively reassuring fact with regard to this issue is Hezbollah’s recent political manifesto which, despite maintaining a firm position on the importance of resistance, frames it within Lebanon’s interests.
Two main processes are trying to bring into convergence the resistance and Lebanese national interest. The first is the “national dialogue”, which relies on a mechanism of reciprocal consultations between the Lebanese rival factions. The second is informed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 that establishes an international force for peacekeeping and the extension of the control of the territory in the South. The possibility of a progressive integration of the resistance within the Lebanese Armed Forces has been discussed, but Hezbollah is suspicious of the effective capacity of the army to protect the interests of the resistance. Furthermore, there have been cases in which members of the army fled to Israel raising the suspicion that the integration of the resistance within the army may endanger its secrecy and the security of its leaders. Building a relation of mutual trust between the Lebanese military and the resistance is going to be a difficult task for the government.
None of these two processes is under the direct control of the government since the president sponsors the first, and the second is administered by the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission in partnership with the Lebanese Armed Forces. In this regard, the reform of the Lebanese Army is a major point of discussion, although this issue also faces several problems, such as American reluctance to provide weaponry to the Lebanese Army.
Indeed, internal security represents another front to be tackled by the Lebanese executive. Since the formation of the government, the country has witnessed a number of incidents such as rocket shootings and explosions of a rather obscure nature. When referring to the shooting of rockets in North Israel official versions often blame the ubiquitous Al-Qaeda. While the mysterious explosions in the south of the country (for example in Kherbet Silm and in Tayr Falsayh) were not explained, but Israel brought these events to the international attention as supposed evidence of Hezbollah’s violation of Resolution 1701.
More recently, the explosion in Hreit Hreik in the south of Beirut was linked to the presence of Palestinian factions in the suburb of Beirut. These are only a few examples demonstrating the complexity of the internal security issue under the control of the Minister of Interior, Ziad Baroud, who was reconfirmed from the previous government in the presidential quota.
But if security and sovereignty represent the two most intractable problems for the Lebanese government, institutional reform could be the main focus of a pragmatic approach to these issues. Nonetheless, institutional reform is also highly divisive. Reform is urgent under many institutional sectors such as justice, the electoral law and education to mention a few. Recently, the idea of the abolition of sectarianism in Lebanon was also revived, an issue which faces wide opposition and which might spark bitterness along sectarian lines.
This could be the chance to undertake more balanced developmental policies, although any expectations of major changes would be misplaced. The Lebanese government is too distracted by its own survival and can only undertake cautious steps on the perilous path of national stability.
Filippo Dionigi - researcher specializing in Lebanon and Hezbollah




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samer khayat
January 28 2010 07:45
Report abuseSalim Al-Mutairi
January 31 2010 08:22
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