The Odd Couple

For almost a decade now, the relationship between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq has intrigued regional commentators—quite an achievement in a region accustomed to cynical partnerships and unexpected romances between old foes. Decades of avowed Turkish hostility toward any expression of Kurdish autonomy in the region have given way to increasing collaboration, culminating in a de facto Turkish recognition of Kurdish sovereignty in northern Iraq. This has challenged the Turkish taboo regarding Kurdish nationalism, but also many of the prevailing conceptions about regional geopolitics.

The story dates to the early days of the Republic of Turkey. Following its establishment, its Kemalist founders came to perceive the fledgling expressions of Kurdish nationalism as a threat to their vision of the Republic. Subsequently Kurdish nationalism was met with harsh suppression by Ankara. This culminated in a process of imposed Turkification, which denied the existence of the Kurdish nation, prohibiting the use of the Kurdish language in schools, universities and media. Even the use of the term “Kurd” itself, was replaced by the term ‘mountain Turks’.

The campaign to uproot Kurdish nationalism continues to this day. However, in light of emergence of various Kurdish movements, such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), known for fanning the flames of Kurdish nationalism, the campaign has proved rather unsuccessful. Since then Ankara has been occupied with a bloody war in eastern Anatolia, which has claimed tens of thousands of lives on both sides, and posed a constant threat to Turkey’s internal stability.

Ankara’s antipathy toward any manifestation of Kurdish nationalism has not been confined to its own territory. During its prolonged struggle against Kurdish nationalism it became painfully aware of how easily ideas, arms, and people flow interchangeably between the ‘mountain Turks’ of Iran, Iraq and Turkey through the long, sometimes unprotected, borders between the three states. This antagonism grew even stronger as PKK guerrillas began to take refuge among their brethren in Iraq during the conflict and began using their territory to launch attacks against Turkish targets.

Nevertheless, the Kurds in Iraq have always compelled Turkey to embrace a more creative policy than their Iranian or Syrian counterparts. Troubled by the periodical radicalisation of Baghdad and its occasional flirtation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Turkey did not hesitate to use the Kurdish card to counteract Baghdad. Thus, on occasions, Turkey preferred to turn a blind eye toward Kurdish actions in northern Iraq, as long as it could cover the eyes of its own Kurdish citizens. Notwithstanding, whenever it sensed that Iraq’s unity was under threat from Kurdish actions, it backed from its policies and at times even intervened militarily. However, any sign of formal recognition remained out of the question.

This all changed in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Following Iraq’s suppression of a yet another Kurdish uprising, and the subsequent flow of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees into Turkey, a Kurdish safe haven was established in northern Iraq, which soon emerged as a de facto state led by the KRG. Enduring instability and perpetual conflict between the various Kurdish parties within the KRG, instilled Ankara with hopes for the KRG’s natural death, but those faded with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Amid the ensuing chaos, and the threat of civil war, the KRG came to be seen as an island of stability, free of sectarian bloodshed, and even enjoying an economic boom. Turkey now faced two options: sticking to its policy of non-recognition, or accepting reality and making the best of it. Grudgingly, it chose to face reality

Since then cooperation between Turkey and the KRG has advanced on various fronts. Turkish firms and contractors have been involved in profitable oil exploration, media, and construction projects. Turkish firms, for example, constructed the Erbil International Airport. Last October, Turkey opened a consulate in Erbil, the KRG’s capital, much to the dismay of Baghdad, which views this limited recognition as another step toward the realisation of Kurdish aspiration to secede from Iraq. The Kurdish parties had long before installed their representatives in Ankara, which functions as de facto diplomats.

Relations have, however, been strained at times, particularly over the PKK. Turkey has repeatedly called on the KRG to rid its territory of PKK bases, and has mounted military incursions in the last few years, reminiscent of its major military onslaughts during the 1990s. The KRG has criticised but condoned these armed bids in exchange for Turkish recognition, thus exposing itself increasingly to Kurdish criticism. However, this issue has not stopped the relationship from flowering.

What could explain Turkeys’s change of heart? Some point to its economic interests in the region, which amount to billions of dollars. Those who have notably benefited from this cooperation include Turkish oil giants such as Genel Enerji and Petoil. Others argue that Ankara, governed by the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party, view the Sunni Kurds as a potential bulwark against a Shiite take-over of Iraq, under Iranian auspices. Both arguments provide only a partial explanation of these recent developments. The latter is more easily refuted.

First, the secularist leadership of the KRG has always refrained from affiliating itself with pan-Islamist trends and has never presented itself as a Sunni leadership—in fact, the Kurds have suffered immensely from extremist terrorism because of the perception of Kurds as collaborators with the West. Second, Ankara has proven to be rather placid regarding the bogeyman of the Shiite Crescent, at least in comparison to other governments in the region.

The full explanation can be found in Turkey itself. Gradually more integrated in the Middle Eastern arena, Turkey is, now more than ever, aware of the negative impact of chronic instability on its border, particularly with regard to its aspirations of European Union candidacy. Hence, a stable, pro-Western Kurdish government is a far better alternative to the prevalent instability of Iraq’s other areas, or the images of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees massing on the Turkish border, as happened in 1991.

Furthermore, the rapprochement with the KRG has had no impact on Turkish-Kurdish relations within Turkey. Ankara still suppresses any sign of Kurdish nationalism—only recently the Turkish Constitutional Courtoutlawed the Democratic Society Party for advocating Kurdish separatism and its alleged links with the PKK. If any positive change has taken place in recent years regarding the civil rights of the Kurds in Turkey it should be credited to European pressure or to the effort of Turkish parties, such as the AKP for instance, to win Kurdish votes. In fact, the KRG’s silence on the subject can only serve Turkish propaganda.

This rapprochement says less about Turkey, than it does about the KRG. Striving for international legitimacy, even the limited recognition obtained from Turkey is a major achievement for the KRG, both domestically and internationally. Nonetheless, with the rapidly changing geopolitical map of the Middle East in the new decade, such small victories are only temporary—and the Kurds probably know it better than anyone else.

Yaniv Voller – London based researcher specialising in Iraqi Kurdistan