What’s Next for Hezbollah?

Hezbollah’s unexpected defeat at the polls in last month’s parliamentary elections in Lebanon has been billed as a significant success for the Western-backed March 14 coalition, led by Saad Hariri, who is now tipped to become Lebanon’s new Prime Minister. Indeed, March 14 benefited from an exceptionally strong turnout – almost 55% of Lebanon’s 3.26 million registered voters cast ballots – eventually winning 68 parliamentary seats (a one-seat gain from the last elections in 2005), while March 8 claimed 57 seats. While initial assessments suggest that Hezbollah has been weakened by the outcome of the election, a closer look at events in recent weeks suggests that Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon remains in fact very much unchanged, and virtually unchallenged. A number of points are worth noting in this respect.

First and foremost, the election results demonstrate that Hezbollah still retains its quasi-hegemonic position among the Shiite population, which turned out en masse to vote for Hezbollah candidates, including in electoral districts where the Party of God ran virtually unopposed. This is significant, since the Shiite community has had to bear the brunt of Israel’s attacks against Lebanon in the summer of 2006, in a war largely blamed on Hezbollah’s cross-border kidnapping of two IDF soldiers. Hezbollah can therefore be said to have successfully managed the negative fallout from the war on its popular base, which remains largely loyal to Hassan Nasrallah, despite the emergence of opposing Shiite parties in the aftermath of the July war, such as The Lebanese Option Gathering (LOG).

In addition to being bolstered by the unyielding support of the Shiite community, Hezbollah can also count on its Amal allies, led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berry, who has recently been re-elected for a further term in office. Berri’s re-election, particularly, is a clear signal that the March 14 coalition has already had to make a number of political concessions to the opposition, despite having won the elections. Indeed, March 14 leaders are pragmatic enough to realize that they are unable to govern Lebanon without March 8, and Hariri’s humble victory speech – which lacked any sign of triumphalism – readily acknowledged this reality. The process of government formation is expected to be a long and drawn-out one in which both sides will have to make concessions, not simply Hezbollah.

In this respect, the likeliest outcome of the elections is the formation of yet another national unity government, in which Hezbollah would have a substantial say on government decisions – although the exact composition of the cabinet remains, to this day, subject to intense negotiations. Thus, despite gracefully accepting his bloc’s defeat in the elections, Hassan Nasrallah has already made it very clear that he would insist on retaining veto powers on government decisions (the so-called “blocking third”). These veto powers had been granted to March 8 in the previous cabinet after a successful show of force by Hezbollah gunmen during inter-communal street clashes in Beirut in May 2008, which had effectively ended months of political deadlock between the two camps and left March 14 badly bruised.

Incidentally, by referring to the May 2008 clashes as a ’glorious day for the Resistance’ only a few weeks before the June 7 elections, Nasrallah may have unwittingly contributed to the uneasiness of some Christian voters who have grown increasingly distrustful of Hezbollah’s alliance with General Michel Aoun, thereby costing Aoun a large number of votes in key Christian constituencies. Yet despite adopting a much more conciliatory tone in his first speech after losing the elections, Nasrallah nevertheless warned that the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal and role as a ‘Lebanese resistance party’ was not open to debate. This should be taken as a clear indication that Hezbollah is not prepared to make any compromise on that thorny issue, despite accusations, after the May 2008 incidents, that it had failed in its promise never to use its arms for ‘internal’ purposes.

Consequently, Hezbollah may have lost the elections but it is in fact March 14 that now faces an unenviable catch-22 situation. Indeed, either Hariri and his allies decide to reject Hezbollah’s demands and thus expose themselves to yet another protracted conflict with the March 8 alliance, with all the devastating consequences this entails (and there is no doubt in Hariri’s mind that the May 2008 events were only a preview of what Hezbollah can do if it is denied power). Or, and this is the more likely option, the March 14 coalition decides to accommodate Hezbollah’s minimum demands in a national unity government, but in so doing sees its electoral gains translated into a de facto return to the pre-electoral status quo.

Bowing down to Hezbollah’s demands would be particularly unsatisfactory for March 14, as such a move might in fact alienate many of its supporters who had hoped for genuine change after their coalition’s election victory. A return to the status quo, though guaranteeing some semblance of normality, particularly over the lucrative summer season, would also mean that many of the key issues that have dogged the nation, such as the status of Hezbollah’s weapons, will simply be brushed under the carpet, where they will brew under the surface until the next political crisis erupts.

All in all, therefore, the June 7 election results seem highly paradoxical indeed: although it was Hezbollah who lost, it is ultimately March 14 who will have to make political concessions if it wants to govern effectively.  Only time will tell, but in the end the real winners of the June 7 elections may well turn out to be Hezbollah, not March 14.

Raphaëlle Camilleri – PhD candidate in War Studies at King’s College London