The War of Ideas

In November last year, a group of up to twenty young men was arrested in Minneapolis. They were accused of belonging to Al Shabaab, the extremist movement that has taken control over at least half of Somalia’s territory and which has very close ties to al Qaeda. The New York Times described this case as ‘one of the most extensive domestic terrorism investigations since the Sept. 11 attacks’. Among the evidence that this was a very dangerous group, one of its former members, Shirwa Ahmed, blew himself up in a suicide attack in 2008 in the north of Somalia. In the end, what seemed to disturb US national authorities the most was that all suspects carried American passports and all were American citizens.

The debate in the US and Europe on whether or not to intervene in states like Somalia and Afghanistan so as to deny terrorist groups their safe havens has evolved in such a way that the two positions are now mutually exclusive. One side claims that if terrorists’ easy access to safe havens like Somalia or Afghanistan under Taliban rule is not prevented, the threat will get out of hand. The other position contests that claim by reminding us that the threat of terrorism can also—and in a more deadlier form—come from within, and that state building enterprises, such as the one in Afghanistan, are destined to fail.

Framing this discussion in such terms is extremely simplistic. As a British philosopher once wrote, ‘any distinction is drawn for a purpose, and a dichotomy is usually offered as part of a claim that one kind of thing is better that the other.’ The debate on terrorism and ‘failed states’—the link that gained so much notoriety after 9/11—exemplifies that description. 

Although a terrorist plot can be planned and executed either in a developed state or in a failing one, terrorist organizations also need bases and training camps, even if those bases are located in inhospitable places like the caves of Afghanistan. Members of terrorist organizations can easily establish themselves in any country, but a terrorist organization will not be able, at least as easily, to build training camps to train recruits in shooting weapons and exploding bombs within a state that controls its borders and effectively controls its territory.

Terrorist organizations, like mafias, take advantage of the lawlessness of today’s failed or failing states to kidnap, extort, finance their activities with other illegal ones, and to recruit new members. It is certainly easier to do all this in a country like Somalia, where all the so-called ‘root causes of terrorism’ such as poverty and oppression are most acute, than it is doing it in Germany, for example, and get away with it. The claim that a much too collapsed state is not a good place even for terrorist organizations is refuted by the present case of Somali, the collapsed state that quickly became a paradise for militants.

The US-led intervention in Afghanistan managed, to a considerable degree, to deprive al Qaeda of its safe haven. The problem however is that al Qaeda quickly found other places to establish itself under less pressure. The neighbouring Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, and even as some analysts have warned, Guinea Bissau on the West coast of Africa, were all easy destinations for jihadists who found Afghanistan was no longer the place for them.

Although al Qaeda—and affiliated groups—use a strong anti-modern rhetoric, the organisation and its techniques are highly dependent on the internet and all the pro-mobility elements that make it so easy to travel or communicate over long distances. They use mobile phones, credit cards, TVs, and airplanes, independently of being in Kandahar or in London. Also, as recent years have proven, the biggest threat might come from within. Home-grown terrorists can be indoctrinated either when travelling to Somalia or Pakistan, or by simply accessing jihadi websites on the internet from their apartments in New York.

The most important issue is recruitment, which also adds to the evidence that this debate cannot be restricted to a matter of geography. In this “war of ideas” for the minds of impressionable people, and especially due to the use of internet for radicalization purposes, the traditional notion of territory becomes less important, because all territory is important.

The threat within strong states, and the threat of terrorist safe havens in failing, failed, or collapsed ones, are two sides of the same coin. Police and intelligence work, as well as addressing poverty—though many terrorists are at least from middle classes and are highly educated—and countering radicalization are essential. But facing the problem of the safe havens in today’s and tomorrow’s ‘failed states’ is also crucial. The questions about the latter remain if it is a sustainable approach, and if doesn’t do more harm than good.

Manuel Almeida