Sunnier Skies?

During the Bush Administration years the following joke did the rounds of the corridors of politics: “Do you know who the Vice-President of Iraq is? It’s Dick Cheney”. This idea that, after Saddam Hussein, the evolution of the political landscape in Iraq would be dictated by foreign players and interests is still alive today. Thus, and by the same logic, the future of Iraq’s foreign policy will also be hostage of outside interference, namely from the US or Iran.

At present, it is still very hard to characterize Iraq’s foreign policy, maybe because its government still lacks a foreign policy doctrine with clearly defined goals. This is natural given all the challenges that still prevent Iraq from achieving relative stability. The tensions marking the pre-electoral climate – such as the polemic list issued by the Accountability and Justice Committee, the inability to prevent large-scale suicide bombings, and the ever present threat of a return to sectarian violence, are among the main concerns.

The most likely outcome of the forthcoming March elections is the formation of another coalition. As Foreign Minister of Iraq Hoshyar Zebari recently told The Majalla “the next government coalition will likely be composed of a wide coalition. Most probably, one bloc will not be able to form a government, and the parliamentary blocs could be many.” The formation of such an eclectic government means that any country that seeks to influence the foreign policy of Iraq, be it the US or Iran, will have major problems in doing so in a decisive way.

So, what predictions can be made about the future orientations of Iraq’s foreign policy, particularly in relation to its most powerful neighbours? Looking north, Turkey is Iraq’s biggest trading partner, and Iraq is one among many of the region’s countries being courted by Erdogan’s renewed foreign policy. Although there have recently been tensions regarding the Turkish army intrusions in Iraqi territory to deal with Kurdish rebels, Turkey seems destined to be a close partner. Furthermore, Turkey is a strong opponent of a Kurdish autonomous region and even more of an independent Kurdish state, and thus an important ally for the government in Baghdad also in this regard.

Looking west to Syria, things seem more complicated. As a recent article published in The Majalla has shown, the relationship between the two countries is sort of a paradox. On the one hand, there is the growing economic and cultural interdependence between Syria and Iraq, with great benefits for both sides. On the other hand, this bilateral relation has been marked by serious political tensions. In particular, the Iraqi government has a profound distrust regarding what it considers Syria’s poor job in containing the destabilizing activities of militants and former Baathists who find refuge in Syrian territory. Last year, when Al Maliki’s government requested Syria to deport a few former Baathists, Syria declined and responded if they were to do that, they would have deported Al Maliki in the past [in an allusion to Saddam Hussein’s request]. It is not uncommon to see a bilateral relation marked by tense political ties and strong economic ones, and this might well be the case for the near future of Iraq-Syria relations.

Further south, the relationship between Maliki’s government and Saudi Arabia has been strained. This was aggravated by an episode that took a bigger dimension than it should, when a Saudi preacher (televangelist) called Iraq’s Ayatollah al-Sistani an “atheist” and “debauched”, among other accusations against Iraqi Shiites. Although this declaration was severely criticized within Saudi Arabia, Al Maliki issued a harsh verbal response, accusing Saudi religious institutions of having a hostile attitude towards Shia Muslims. Saudi Arabia still doesn’t have an embassy in Iraq, contrary to Egypt and several other Arab countries – though security concerns do play an important role in this absence.

Finally, eastwards, there is the powerful and nosy Iranian neighbour. As Iraq’s Foreign Minister explained to The Majalla “Iran has influence and maintains wide diplomatic and consular presence in Iraq and has extensive relations with all Iraqi parties. There is an Iranian insistence on maintaining presence in Iraq, unlike Arab countries which are not that insistent.” However, the assumption that the Shia factor makes it inevitable that Iran will determine the future external behaviour of the Iraqi government is misleading. In particular, it presupposes that all Iraqi Shiia parties, in particular the Islamic Dawa Party and the Supreme Council, share the same views about what ought to be the nature the Iranian presence in Iraq. And yet, a close bilateral relationship, at the political, economic and cultural levels between Iraq and Iran is inevitable. It is in the interest of both countries and the region that it works.

The future of Iraq’s foreign policy and the nature of its alliances will mainly depend on how the internal political game in Iraq will unfold. If a national identity and all-inclusive national project can gain momentum, there is no reason why Iraq’s external relations will have to be limited to what foreign interferences seek to dictate.

Manuel Almeida