Judgement Day

President Obama’s election was greeted by the world as a harbinger of the positive changes that were to come. His campaign, run on the promise of change, was welcome by the international community, and most of all, by those looking for a successful end to the challenge in Afghanistan-Pakistan. Nonetheless, these promises created expectations that even Obama grew concerned about meeting. While only a year has passed since his inauguration, it is certainly an important moment to assess his policies, particularly regarding those in Afghanistan and Pakistan where there is much to be done.

Brookings Institution Fellow, Vanda Felbab Brown, is in a particularly good position to measure the progresses and shortcomings of the administration in this area. While various publications have also discussed Obama’s first year in the White House, her report is unique as it is based on specific recommendations she provided the administration when Obama was inaugurated.  The Status Report now takes a look at how Obama’s policy differed from their suggestions, and how these alterations have improved or weakened the US’s goals in Afghanistan-Pakistan. Although rigorous in their assessment, the Brookings Institution provides a fair, and surprisingly positive review of the President’s decisions in the region thus far.

The Brookings report begins by acknowledging that the question of Afghanistan was part of an important debate within the United States. In other words, that there were significant internal political obstacles that could have stood in the way of decisive action on the part of the administration. Yet, despite this challenge, the Obama administration, according to Brown ‘announced in December 2009 the right strategy to accomplish the objectives laid out for Afghanistan-Pakistan. He also committed much needed resources to accomplish them.’

The overall verdict of Obama’s policy however was not entirely positive according to her assessment. While he did implement the correct policy, Brown argues that 2009 turned out to be a year of lost opportunities in Afghanistan. The reason for this is that the momentum of improving strategies was compromised by the corruption in Afghanistan, and apathy on the part of the Afghan administration. As a result, she argues, the window of opportunity to defeat the insurgency partly closed, and as a committed party in the country, the US needs to be held accountable on the shortcomings of its ability to confront local issues.  ‘The Obama administration’s policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan thus earns a B.’

A “B” in the American grading system, is somewhere between satisfactory and excellent. The reason for Brown concluding that this was the overall performance of the US was two-fold. Great strides took place in March 2009 after a two month review was put into place. This review consisted of a broad counterinsurgency effort which sought to reverse the worsening security situation in Afghanistan. As the Brookings Institution had expected, these measures created ‘the necessary environment for a large-scale economic development effort, including a strong agricultural program that would also reduce poppy cultivation.’

Unfortunately, the comprehensive nature of the approach was weakened by what Brown called a ‘narrow counterterrorism focus that emphasized the need to prevent Al-Qaeda havens in Afghanistan.’ Although limiting Al-Qaeda havens is surely an important goal for American interests, in terms of the overarching goals of counterterrorism, Brown considers such a strategy short sighted. More importantly, focusing mainly on the interests of the US in the area failed to appeal to Afghans. When trying to win the hearts and minds of locals, such oversights can be detrimental. Furthermore, this review did not include a thorough investigation of the resources required to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, an issue that was later raised by the new US Commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal.

While this prompted an additional review by President Obama which evaluated the challenges McChrystal was facing, Brown argues that the second review did little, if nothing, to improve the confidence of Americans and Afghans of the new direction of the US in the region. Expectations were equally hurt with the advent of Karzai’s fraudulent campaign.

On the other hand, Brown was positive in her review of the administration’s performance in Pakistan, arguing that despite inheriting a deteriorating security relationship, the US was able to help the Pakistani ‘military and civilian leadership to devote the will and capacity to confront the Pakistani jihadists…’

Overall, the Brookings Institution’s assessment is positive and comprehensive. For one, an assessment of the US’s accomplishments in the region might have only been measured by assessing how American interests were advanced. Yet the report is also dedicated to measuring how the actions of the US affected local issues, which might have a lesser importance for American interests, but far greater implications for the region as a whole.

In addition to taking into account the interests of all parties, Brown’s report is also balanced as she considers the way in which American politics limit or support successful strategies in the country’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, her ability to question the speed at which important decisions were taken allows for the US, to be held accountable for its strategy in a region that is easily destabilized.

The report, is thus balanced in its assessment. While remaining critical of the administrations short comings and, at times, short sighted approach, it continues to acknowledge that progress was made. Most notably, Brown was quick to acknowledge the efforts of the administration which successfully improved the security situation in some regions of the country.

It is fair, then, to agree with Brown on the potential that lies ahead in America’s involvement in the region. Namely, that while the American military is not yet out of the woods with regards to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the necessary foundations have been put into place in order to complete a successful counterinsurgency strategy.