The Strength of Soft Counter-terrorism
Saudi Arabia’s Soft Counter-terrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare Carnegie Papers Christopher Boucek September 2008
The Strength of Soft Counter-terrorism
Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism campaign has shocked many with its accomplishments. Following the deadly terrorist attacks in 2003, the Kingdom initiated a program that focused on the use of soft measures to counter the ideological influence of violent extremists. While the program has been criticized for being too soft, Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, highlights the progress that this strategy has initiated in the field of counterterrorism.
The report, Saudi Arabia’s Soft Counterterrorism Strategy, explains that the primary objective behind this program is to engage and combat an ideology that the Saudi government believes is based on corrupted and deviant interpretations of Islam. Boucek explains further that the Saudi government created this program based on the understanding that violent extremism has to be combated from a multi-pronged approach, as relying solely on traditional security measures has proved an inefficient strategy.
As such, the Saudi government formulated a program aimed at prevention, rehabilitation, and post-release care, or PRAC. The program, operational since 2004, has had success rates in the 90 percentile. This impressive success rate, argues Boucek, is due to the soft policies that seek to address the underlying factors that led these people to look to violent Islamism in the first place. In order to achieve their goals, the Kingdom has focused its efforts on strengthening the legitimacy of the government and reinforcing the traditional Saudi interpretation of Islam, which stresses ‘obedience and loyalty to the state and its leadership.’
Interestingly, this implies that the counterterrorist methods of Saudi Arabia have moved beyond traditional security strategies. The government instead interprets terrorism as a war of ideas; and one in which the winner is the group who can demonstrate that their version of Islam is the correct one. As a result, much of the efforts of PRAC aim to cast extremists as illegitimate for perverting true Islam.
The key components of the Kingdom’s counterterrorism policy focus on prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare programs. Importantly, the psychological and social emphases of these programs demonstrate that the involvement of terrorists with extremist groups can be deterred through the right social network. It is commendable that the Kingdom understood the capacity and responsibility it has to create and support the types of networks that prevent men and women form joining terrorist groups.
An important example of this recognition is the prevention programs that are included in school curricula. These government programs, focused on educating the public about radical Islam and providing alternatives to radicalization, are varied and thus provide a wide-range of appeal to different demographics. The projects range from ‘athletic competitions, to lectures, writing contests, and public information campaigns’ all of which, the report claims, have had a significant impact on Saudi Arabia’s perceptions of terrorism.
While prevention is important, it is the rehabilitation and aftercare aspects of the strategy that have attracted the most attention for their soft—albeit successful—characteristics. These parts of the program focus on comprehensive counselling initiatives designed to re-educate violent extremists and sympathizers and to encourage extremists to renounce terrorist ideologies. The government also encourages family participation in the process and even provides alternative income in cases where the sole breadwinner has been imprisoned. Other aid, such as schooling and health care are also provided.
The success of these tactics is found in that they not only create a dialogue of comprehension with the detainees, but they also demonstrate that “the system” can work on their behalf. When the government shows detainees that they are on their side, and look to support them and their family, it is difficult for detainees to hold on to views that claim the government ‘is complicit with infidels.’ Such efforts are also successful because they prevent radical groups from further influencing families when their members are gone. ‘The government recognizes that if it fails to provide this support, it is very possible that extremist elements will move in and do so.’
However, the success that the program boasts today was not easy to come by. When the program began, meetings between counsellors and detainees did not go well. Many detainees refused to meet with clerics, and overtly questioned their religious authority. However, as time passed, and the program gained credibility, the initial hostility that detainees expressed decreased. Today, some detainees only attend one session before denouncing their extremist beliefs. While the majority attend various sessions, the success rate of the program, and its progressive measures, speaks to the potential that initiatives with a focus “soft” measures might have in different conflicts—and even in the general rehabilitation of prisoners who are not detained on accounts of terrorism.
The aspect of the program that perhaps is most impressive however, is the aftercare attention that former detainees receive. While many rehabilitation programs exist, very few continue to stay in contact with and support former radicals. Yet, the continuation of these services is most successful in preventing recidivism ‘by addressing social concerns before they become grievances.’ For example, once individuals renounced their radical beliefs, previous assistance is provided in locating a job and receiving other benefits, including additional government stipends, a car, and an apartment. Prisoners are also encouraged to marry and have children, as it is widely believed that men with responsibilities will be less likely to be attracted to violence and radical views. Consequently, the result of these aftercare programs is that they are able to encourage the successful reintegration of detainees into Saudi society.
Boucek’s final assessment of the counterterrorism strategy of the Saudi Kingdom is quite positive, recommending that other nations emulate the program. Whilst governments stand to learn much from the Saudi experience, one must also keep in mind the substantial amount of resources and commitment that Saudi society and its government dedicated to the program. This type of societal commitment is crucial to the program’s success. Done half-heartedly, it is unlikely that a similar program would achieve the main attributes of the Saudi strategy, which is to create an all-encompassing social network that supports detainees and prevents future radicalization.
Another interesting aspect of counter-terrorism that was not addressed in the report has the role of reconciliation between former terrorists and those who were victimized by their actions. The expectations of victims are also important factors to take into account when designing strategies for counter-terrorism, as their disillusionment with government strategies could potentially spark another round of extremism.
Nonetheless, throughout the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, similar programs are starting to emerge. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia have all established rehabilitation and engagement programs, as has the US military through Task Force 134 in Iraq. Boucek notes the spread of this strategy is ultimately based upon the recognition that the defeat of extremism cannot be achieved through hard security measures alone. ‘That in itself, is a major accomplishment’ of the Saudi program.
For the full report please see: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=22155
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