The Nuclear Road
Between Tehran and Pyongyang
The Nuclear Road
In May 2009, North Korea conducted its second-ever nuclear test. Allegedly, one of the goals of the test was to show the progress in Pyongyang’s nuclear know-how to Iranian officials. In July, the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee, following from the Security Council’s resolution 1874, imposed sanctions on three North Korean companies and one Iran-based company. In August, the United Arab Emirates, also in compliance with resolution 1874, seized a North Korean ship carrying weapons to Iran. In December, Thailand held a plane also carrying North Korean weapons. American officials declared that the cargo’s probable destination was Iran.
These events, whether real or alleged, underscore one of the foremost fears of Western and Israeli officials and security experts: cooperation in the development of nuclear and missile programmes between Tehran and Pyongyang. Or more specifically, North Korea’s transfer of nuclear and missile technology, materials and know-how to Iran.
Nuclear collaboration between North Korea and Iran dates back to at least the 1990s. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or Iran Revolutionary Guards, has been the organisation in charge of dealing with Pyongyang when it comes to nuclear matters since then. Being a branch of the military actively involved in the development of Iran’s nuclear programme, the IRGC is well-positioned to negotiate with the North Korean military, which is the main driver behind North Korea’s nuclear activities. Reports about talks between both first surfaced during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-94. Iranian leaders, wary of a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East in the midst of the uncertainties that followed the end of the Cold War, decided to turn to the far-flung Asian country for help with their indigenous nuclear programme.
From a market perspective, Iran and North Korea are the perfect nuclear business partners. Tehran has cash and abundant energy resources, two elements that Pyongyang desperately needs. Meanwhile, North Korea’s nuclear programme is much more developed than Iran’s, making its technology transfers and technical know-how precious commodities in the Middle Eastern country. Moreover, from at least 2003 North Korean experts and officials have been spotted in Iran, working to modify Tehran’s Shahab missiles in order to allow them to fit nuclear warheads. Reports also indicate that North Korean experts have been actively involved in developing Iran’s underground nuclear facilities. Myong Lyu-do, a well-renowned North Korean specialist on the development of these facilities, has been travelling back and forth to Iran since early 2005.
Cooperation between these two countries in the nuclear field has internationalized, further compounding the fears of Western and Israeli security experts. Iranian and North Korean officials were working together in the development of the Al Kibar plutonium nuclear reactor, in Northeast Syria, which Israel bombed in September 2007. Intelligence reports suggest that an undisclosed number of IRGC and up to ten North Koreans were killed in the bombing. Joint work in other facilities throughout the Middle East yet to be discovered is a real possibility.
Missile transfers from North Korea to Iran are a second area of concern for international officials and security experts. Transfer of this type of weapons is one of the main sources of capital for cash-strapped North Korea. Iran has been one of its major clients since the mid-1980s, when Pyongyang transferred Scud-B missiles. These, along with those offered by Libya and Syria, served Tehran to start developing an indigenous missile programme.
For over two decades, North Korea has been Iran’s most reliable missile technology, material and know-how supplier. The Shahab class, which includes medium-range, long-range and satellite-propelling missiles, is to a large extent based on North Korea’s Nodong and Taepodong missiles. As is the case with nuclear cooperation, the IRGC is Iran’s main point of contact with the North Korean military when it comes to missile-related transfers. In fact, cooperation in the fields of nuclear and missile weapons is closely interlinked. The Shahab-3, a medium-range rocket with an estimated reach of up to 1,600 kilometres, is the missile that Iranian technicians and their North Korean counterparts have been trying to modify to fit a nuclear warhead. The Shahab-3 can hit Israel, which explains Tel Aviv’s preparations for strikes on Iranian nuclear and missile facilities.
Hezbollah is one of the main beneficiaries of cooperation between Iran and North Korea. Hezbollah’s close links with the IRGC are well-known. The IRGC has been acting as an intermediary between Hezbollah and North Korea since the late 1980s. The Asian country has transferred arms to the Lebanon-based organisation and trained its members for over two decades now. Collaboration between both was upgraded during the 2000s, when the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, a government-controlled North Korean company, brought experts and equipment to Southern Lebanon to construct underground facilities. Western and Israeli security experts concur that these facilities could eventually host nuclear materials.
Nuclear and missile cooperation between Iran and North Korea is at the top of the security agenda in the United States and Israel. The fear of a North Korean nuclear or missile attack on the United States is negligible. In contrast, proliferation to Iran has been ongoing for over two decades. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton have called for both countries to halt their nuclear programmes and for North Korea to refrain from proliferation, implicitly suggesting that the two issues are linked. Similarly, resolution 1874, which the United States was instrumental in drafting, focused on halting Pyongyang’s arms transfers. Earlier, Condoleezza Rice made the link between North Korea’s proliferation and Iran’s nuclear programme clearer, connecting the talks aimed at curtailing Pyongyang’s nuclear programme to the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue.
Israel is arguably the country with the greatest interest in halting cooperation between Iran and North Korea. However, whereas the United States has to a large extent concentrated on the country of origin of nuclear and missile technology and material, North Korea, Israel has focused on the other end, Iran. And while the United States has so far emphasized dialogue, Israel has called for strikes on Iranian military facilities. Tel Aviv understands that its leverage over Pyongyang is non-existent, so it has focused on the threat closest to home.
Ultimately, integration of North Korea within the world economy seems to be the only plausible way of putting an end to its proliferation and cooperation with Iran. Pyongyang’s nuclear programme does not significantly boost North Korea’s security from a possible American military strike. Its defensive and offensive weapons of mass destruction suffice for this. However, a well-developed nuclear programme is an excellent instrument to raise capital. Absent competition from the A. Q. Khan network, North Korea is the main player in the nuclear proliferation business. If this revenue stream were to be replaced by proper integration in the world economy, including access to the American and Japanese markets, North Korea would almost certainly give up nuclear proliferation. However, as long as Pyongyang is not part of the world economy, Iranian-North Korean nuclear and missile cooperation will continue.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo - Researcher in counter-proliferation and East Asian politics
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