The current Arab uprisings will not necessarily favor Al-Qaeda

“You should not listen to Bin Laden and his followers,” said Qadhafi in a phone call addressed to residents of the Libyan town of Al-Zawiya. Playing the Islamist card—an old trick of dictators when under pressure—the still Libyan leader expected to raise alarm among ordinary Libyan citizens that the alternative to his government is Al-Qaeda, but also, and perhaps strategically more relevant to Qadhafi, to convince the coalition that toppling his government could be a big mistake.

Say the word Al-Qaeda, and the West will listen. As soon as the rumor spread that among the multifaceted armed opposition there were members of Al-Qaeda, the alarm bell went off in western capitals. Almost simultaneously, the eastern city of Derna, now in the hands of the opposition, became the object of western concern and of numerous journalistic pieces due to its reputation for being a hotbed for jihadists. In particular, the information that Derna has supplied more volunteers per capita to the Iraqi insurgency than any other city in the Arab world has traveled the globe.

Al-Qaeda has proven to have a great capacity to adapt to new situations, and it will surely seek to take advantage of the current Arab uprising, without interfering too much, aware that any mistake could backfire and hurt the name and strategic objectives of the organization. “If there is a power vacuum in Libya there will be an open market for Al-Qaeda,” a former commander of the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group told CNN.

In Libya, one of the scenarios where Al-Qaeda could gain momentum is the dragging of the current contest for power for an indefinite time. With the two sides focused on the war, the chaos and power vacuums that would inevitably arise from a prolonged civil war would certainly fit the type of activity of recruitment among the youth and violent operations that have characterized Al-Qaeda’s presence in similar situations. Another scenario, which western leaders seem to be weary of, is the deployment of western ground troops in Libyan territory. Such foreign presence in the Libyan conflict fits perfectly the kind of anti-crusadist and imperialist rhetoric so typical of Al-Qaeda, and that would surely resonate with a larger social audience beyond the jihadists who belong to or are closely associated with Al-Qaeda.

Several members of the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group have naturally joined the armed opposition against Qadhafi’s forces. Yet, this does not mean that Al-Qaeda is the natural victor. Jihadism in Libya is a product of Qadhafi’s repression, not of inherent radicalism. Furthermore, the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group and Al-Qaeda are not one and the same organization, although there are instances of occasional collaboration between both organizations in the past.

As recently reported by The Economist, the Libyan jihadists seem to be thankful for the coalition’s air campaign, and not in an instrumental sense. “It’s changed the way we look at the West. They saved our people and we have to say thanks,” said one of the jihadists. Even the rebels from Derna seem to be frustrated by the “Al-Qaeda emirate” reputation that their city has earned in recent weeks.

If countries like Egypt, Yemen and Libya evolve to more democratic, less repressive, and more responsible forms of government, then it is hard to see how Al-Qaeda can take advantage of the Arab revolution, as the frustration and repression that give rise to radicalism in the region will suffer a serious blow.

By Manuel Almeida

Published: Wednesday 06 April 2011 Updated: Wednesday 06 April 2011