Know Your Enemy
An Iranian cleric waves a national flag
The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Operational and Policy Implications
Marine Corps University
Michael Eisenstadt
August 2011
Almost the entirety of the first three pages of this report is used to overcome the many assumptions that are often made about the leadership in Tehran. Eisenstadt tells us that Iran is not an irrational, emotive adversary but rather is able “to engage in rational calculation.” and that the state is “not insensitive to risks and costs.” While these statements are meant to quickly reassure the reader that Iranian leaders use the same tools of statecraft to which the US is accustomed, such statements carry with them overtures of profound ignorance that Eisenstadt feels he needs to address. While he cannot be faulted for ensuring everyone is proceeding from the same assumptions, it creates a sense of unease to think that the leaders of the Marine Corps need to be told that Iran is partial to national interest just as much as everyone else in the international community. If the goal of this report is to ‘know one’s enemy’ then the opening section shows just how much such work is needed in the US armed forces with regards to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The report proceeds with a breakdown of the motives behind Iranian strategic thinking. For Eisenstadt, defense planning in Iran means first transforming Iran into a regional power; secondly, a posture of deterrence; and thirdly fostering a culture of self-reliance. These motives are inspired by the idea of waning US power in the region combined with an Iranian self-image or regional superiority. As was apparent in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, US conventional military superiority remains unparalleled and so Iran seeks to deter any threat rather than face it head on. The so-called deterrent triad of Iran is area denial (disrupting oil from the Persian Gulf), destabilizing neighboring countries through the use of large Shi’a populations there and finally a conventional military response primarily using missiles and rockets. Should deterrence fail Eisenstadt points out that Iran’s modest military budget focuses on unconventional warfare, guerrilla tactics etc. in order to be more effective against a superior military force. Again, the focus on unconventional warfare by America’s enemies is a lesson well learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. The push for self-reliance comes from a deep mistrust of the international community; Iran is described as being “strategically lonely” in this regard. Perhaps this point is even more relevant now the Syrian regime, otherwise an ally of Iran, is fighting its own population in order to stay in power.
The report then moves on to talk about the various hard and soft power options at Iran’s disposal. Here is where Eisenstadt’s expertise in military and security studies becomes most apparent and this section is the most fluid and insightful run down of what Iran’s capabilities are and what the US needs to change in its own strategic culture in order to counter Iran more effectively now and in the future. The highlight here is the differing conceptions of time in warfare that exist between Iran and the US. Eisenstadt points out how for the US military, which has a low threshold for casualties, incredible costs to consider in projecting its power over seas, the pressures of a 24 hour news cycle and a 4 year political term, short and decisive engagements are of paramount importance. For Iran however, many of whose leaders have been in power since the 1980s, time is conceived as far more elongated. Casualties from a devastating US first strike may well be to the benefit of the Iranian regime as the population’s resolve hardens much in the way it did when protesters died in the revolt against the Shah.
A criticism of the report, common in the field of security studies, is the way in which it plays down the dynamics at play within the state, and how this might impact US action against Iran. For instance, the report glosses over the ethnic tensions within the state, as these groups vie for greater autonomy within Iran, the state more and more acts out in the international sphere in the hope of bolstering support for the regime domestically. Correctly interpreting the motives of Iran’s actions in the international sphere must be of prime importance to the US, though Eisenstadt does address this somewhat in his call for “aggressive information activities” in removing the obfuscation around the Iranian decision making process.
In the end, this report marks an interesting and illuminating first step in understanding the strategic culture of a state whose rhetoric and secrecy often makes deciphering its motives and procedures extremely difficult. The report’s own conclusions are modest in scope and Eisenstadt is clear that further research is needed in this area, though this report is an excellent starting point.
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