Supreme Rational Power

Nuclear Fatwa: Religion and Politics in Iran’s Proliferation Strategy

Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Because the suffering and martyrdom of the faithful is promoted by Shi’ite religious doctrine, there is a tendency to portray Iran as “an irrational state with a high pain threshold, driven by the absolute imperatives of religion rather than by the pragmatic concerns of statecraft.” Other analysts completely disregard the religious dimension, arguing that Tehran’s nuclear decision making is guided solely by cost-benefit analyses. Neither of these views leaves much room for political analysis and a means to understanding what is actually going on in Iran. The place of religion in decision-making and foreign policy in Iran’s theocracy must be better understood, or decision-making is reduced to a religious enterprise. The authors of these two reports address this issue, particularly by inquiring about the role of the Supreme Leader in relation to the rest of the political establishment and in relation to Shi’ite religious doctrines.

Eisenstadt, author of Religious Ideologies, Political Doctrines, and Nuclear Decision Making, emphasizes that the characterization of Iran as an irrational regime is unjustified. This much is  evident from Iran’s strategy of minimizing risk by acting through proxies such as Hezbollah or other indirect means. While the regime pursues an activist and anti-status quo line, its means of doing so shows that it engages in rational calculation and displays a superior ability to assess power relationships. As also put forward by Mehdi Khalaji, author of Shiite Jurisprudence, Political Expediency, and Nuclear Weapons, the appearance of the Islamic Republic as a clerical government in which Shi’ite legal authority structures the legal system and the legitimacy of the legal system stems from sharia is too simplistic. The 1979 Revolution presented the revolutionary leaders with the fundamental challenge of taking on the responsibilities of governance and the necessities of running a modern state.

This challenge has led to an interesting dynamic between religion and raison d’état, as especially exemplified by the issuing of fatwas. Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution, changed his fatwas on many issues in order to follow policy restrictions, and the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has followed a similar line. In October 2003 Khamenei issued an oral fatwa forbidding the production and use of WMD in any form. Since then, however, the Supreme Leader has adjusted this statement, shifting his rhetoric to the prohibition of using nuclear weapons as opposed to the development and stockpiling of them. Both authors examine the role of the Supreme Leader in relation to the rest of the political establishment and conclude that Khamenei’s power trumps that of any other in the Islamic Republic. His power is exacerbated by the fact that the government can unilaterally abrogate any religious agreement made with the people if “the agreement is against the interests of the country and Islam.” In other words, anything that could weaken Iran’s position as a leader of the Islamic revolution must be stopped.

Regarding the future, there is some ambiguity about Iran’s willingness to act aggressively, which has to do with its history with Iraq, various political crises in Afghanistan, and conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah, in which it has not been directly involved. If the regime was to gain a nuclear weapon, its posture would change significantly, but it is difficult to predict if its foreign policy would become more directly activist. Eisenstadt argues that there may be signs of a more hardline position winning ground in Iran after Ahmadinejad’s coming to power with his promotion of political Mahdism (to stand fast and fight the enemies of the Islamic Republic in anticipation of the messianic era). These hardliners have also gained strength since the 2009 elections. Subsequent purges further narrowed the regime’s political base. Eisenstadt predicts that a growing faction in Iran will welcome a limited conflict with the United States to bolster domestic support, a stance which draws strength from the perception that the United States’ capacity to project power and influence is declining while Israel’s international isolation is increasing.

This worrisome future is underlined by the increasing strength of hardliners and the reports’ assessment that nuclear decision-making in Iran bears the significant imprint of one man, Khamenei. There are two tensions in these conclusions: Firstly, the way in which the assessment of Khamenei as the sole decision maker on nuclear issues changes the earlier assessment of Iran as a “rational state” to a state which relies on the rationality of one man. Secondly, the description of the rise of hardliners ignores the role played by the West in the hardliners’ ascendancy, and the extent to which  the invasion of Iraq increased support for hardliners. Leaving out this part of the narrative gives the impression that Iranian political developments are shaped exclusively by a the inner logic of the theocratic regime, rather than in interaction with the rest of the world. Hence, while this report does add nuance to the discussion of Iranian nuclear decision-making, it leaves out some crucial engines of change and power shifts.

To read the report in full, click here.

The Majalla: The Leading Arab Magazine

THE MAJALLA offers an array of articles addressing the most important issues facing the Middle East and the world today. From political analysis of developing stories, to debates between world class intellectuals, and interviews of leading political figures, our magazine is dedicated to providing the public with informative analyses of the current events shaping the global order.

More Posts - Website - Twitter - Facebook

Share: Follow @the_majalla