AK-47 machine guns hang in a shelter for Syrian rebels in the Salaheddine district of the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on April 12, 2013. DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP/Getty Images

For now, it appears that Salafist jihadis are set to dominate post-Assad Syria. Yet appearances are deceptive: these groups are operating in a political vacuum and buoyed by the passions of war. Their success is owed partly to alternative political visions, such as socialism and nationalism, being misused by the Syrian Ba’athist regime and the failure of Western promises. In such a chaotic environment, and with the opposition still in disarray, it is natural for Syrian Muslims to turn to their Islamic faith for spiritual succor.

Like the other Abrahamic religions, Islam has developed a martial component, jihad, to deal with the harsh realities of war. This component is activated when war occurs, and switches off when peace returns. The idea of jihad gives many Syrian Muslims faith, direction and strength in a war where right and wrong is blurred and death ubiquitous.

For the observer with a superficial grasp of Islam, it is easy to equate Syrians resorting to the martial component of their faith with support for groups like the Al-Nusra Front. As Elizabeth O’Bagy says in Jihad in Syria, “Growing popularity is not reflective of popular support for their radical ideology.”

In fact, in Syria’s Salafi Insurgents, Aron Lund says most low level Salafist jihadists are really just religiously conservative Sunnis, many of whom turned religious during the war and “care very little about the theoretical strands of Islamism.” One suspects that there are many who join these groups not because they subscribe to their ideology but because of their fighting ability. Most observers concede that the Al-Nusra Front is among the most militarily-effective groups active in Syria at the moment.

The failure to make this distinction has led many to conclude that the Al-Nusra Front and similar groups will play a disproportionate role in post-Assad Syria, especially seeing that other theoretical strands of Islamism are on the wane. After all, the Syrian Brotherhood’s vision—which is more liberal, according to Ashes of Hama author Raphaёl Lefèvre—seems to have erratic support, and is perhaps geared to the political fracas to come rather than the current situation.

Furthermore, Sufism has been co-opted by the regime, as Dr. Thomas Pierret shows in Religion and State in Syria. Many of the brigades I interviewed cited the Assad regime’s turn to Sufism as one of the main reasons for turning to Salafism in the first place: Abu Jihad, one of the commanders of Zahir Baybar’s brigade, told me that “Sheikh Ramadan Buti and Ahmed Hassoun [both Sufis] failed to condemn the regime when the regime oppressed us.”

Yet Syrians are not passive receptacles. The FSA’s Islamist Brigades have already rejected Al-Qaeda ideology, indicating that Syrians are engaging with their country’s political destiny. In addition, Salafist jihadi groups like Jabhat Al-Nusra demand too much from their adherents. Many Salafist jihadi brigades demand total obedience from their members—which means renouncing things like smoking, because it is considered sinful and an impediment to victory. Many fighters I talked to said that the smoking ban was one of the reasons they did not join these brigades.

If strictness prevents Syrians from joining these brigades in war, how will they embrace them in peace time? In fact, if the Bosnian experience is anything to go by, Salafist jihadis become a political embarrassment in peacetime. It is no wonder that Salafi umbrella organizations like the Syrian Islamic Front appear more moderate than expected. As Lund suggests, the Syrian Islamic Front, aims for an Islamic state, but still disregards the fatwas of Ibn Tayimiyyah declaring the Alawites apostates. Instead, the Syrian Islamic Front, considers minorities like the Alawites and Druze as people of distinct religions who can thus have a place in post-Assad Syria. The implication is that if the front is adjusting to the Syrian milieu, other groups who cannot compromise are likely to be marginalized.

Salafist jihadis will also have to contend with Syria’s tradition of civil activism, its rich intellectual heritage and the established religious institutions (which rival Egypt). Even the Salafi religious scholars I spoke to were tempering the religious zeal of the fighters through study. In such an environment, it seems difficult to envisage politically inexperienced Salafist jihadis dominating Syria’s political landscape after Assad.

The key to diffusing the jihadis is to stabilize the situation quickly. Reviving Syria’s political and economic life and investing in Syria’s indigenous religious institutions will ensure the return of civil society. In such a situation, Salafist jihadis will have to either enter politics, remain quiet, or take up arms. If they choose the first option, they will have to offer compelling ideas and learn compromise. They will be marginalized if they choose the latter two. Already, there are indications that organization like the Syrian Islamic Front are in the process of presenting their ‘third way,’ implying that they are open to dialogue. Western policymakers must stop viewing the Syrian crisis through the prism of counter-terrorism and realize that Salafist jihadis flourish when they are repressed and in wartime—not when civil society is alive.

People stand in a building damaged in the twin car bombing in Reyhanlı, Turkey. BULENT KILIC/AFP/Getty Images

On May 11, two powerful car bombs ripped through the Turkish town of Reyhanlı on the Syrian border, killing at least 51 people. This was not only the worst cross-border spillover of the Syrian conflict to date—it was also the deadliest terror attack in Turkey’s recent history.

But if you were watching Turkish television or reading the national papers the next day, you could be forgiven for thinking that nothing had happened in Reyhanlı. Dominating the airwaves instead were the season finale of a popular talent show and the derby match between Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray (which was marred by racial slurs against Gala’s Ivorian star striker, Didier Drogba, and the fatal stabbing of a teenage Fener supporter).

This is because immediately after the bombings, a local court imposed a media blackout on all reporting from and about Reyhanlı, which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government supported. Two journalists were subsequently detained while documenting the extent of the devastation, while police clashed with and arrested scores of demonstrators protesting the attack in the northwestern town of İzmit.

How can we make sense of this horrific act of violence and the government’s reaction to it? In an apparent justification of the blackout, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested that the attack had been an attempt to derail the “sensitive process” of reconciliation between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Indeed, in a potentially historic turning point for the three-decade conflict, PKK fighters in Turkey have begun withdrawing to their bases in northern Iraq as part of a ceasefire agreed in March. Mindful of the fact that previous ceasefires were sabotaged by spectacular acts of violence that led to popular outbursts of nationalistic fervour, the government’s desire to keep a lid on provocative news reporting might be understandable.

But what Reyhanlı reveals—and the government seems eager to conceal—is not really about the Kurds or the PKK. (The pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party declared solidarity with the government shortly after the attack.) It is about Syria, and Turkey’s involvement in its civil war.

Within hours of the bombings, a succession of Turkish officials placed the blame on the government of Bashar Al-Assad, the AKP’s friend-turned-foe. The interior ministry then announced that suspects with links to Syrian intelligence had been detained. This sequence of events raises a number of important questions.

According to the interior minister, the authorities had been alerted to plans for a terrorist attack in the area as early as May 8. Since it took less than a day to apprehend the culprits, we must ask whether the attack could have been averted in the first place. Moreover, if there was a breach of security—as there seems to have been—was it merely accidental, or could it have been intentional? There is still no news on whether there will be a thorough public investigation to identify what went wrong and hold those who are responsible—if there are any—to account.

Crucially, we do not know the primary target of the attacks. It may have been the Turkish government, or the local population of Reyhanlı, which has had an increasingly tense relationship with the growing number of Syrian refugees resident in the town. Alternatively, the twin blasts may have been directed at the refugees themselves, who count among their ranks fighters from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Nusra Front.

What does the bombing say of the Turkish government’s performance of its duty to safeguard its borders and protect its citizens? This is an especially timely question, since members of the Al-Nusra Front have become an atrocious fighting force challenging the already-flimsy authority of the FSA. Is the Turkish government allowing Al-Nusra fighters and Syrian intelligence agents to freely roam across its borders? If, as it is claimed, the Syrian government has the ability to carry out such a spectacular attack inside Turkey after successfully passing through the ostensibly rebel-controlled border region, the attack could be telling of the present course of the Syrian civil war and the likely success of the Turkish (and Western) policy of supporting the anti-Assad opposition.

In the absence of mainstream media coverage of the developments, the dissemination of pictures and reports from Reyhanlı, as well as the public debate on Syria in general, has been taking place in online discussion forums and social networking sites. On the positive side, this demonstrates yet again the difficulty of keeping the public in the dark in the age of Facebook and Twitter. The social media can also be an effective platform for dissent: creative and poignant expressions of criticism (such as the images created by bobiler.org) have been shared thousands of times within the space of a few hours.

On the negative side, it underlines the crucial need for a traditional media that is perceived as sufficiently credible, independent and trustworthy. As the Reyhanlı case has shown, its absence can easily give rise to the dangerous polarization of opinions based on viral rumors, conspiracy theories and false news stories. One of the most widely shared stories on Facebook involved a post that quoted non-existing reports from Western sources like the BBC, The Telegraph and Le Monde, claiming that the Syrian rebels were behind the bombings and that the casualties had exceeded 200.

By trying to stifle the discussion on Syria the Turkish government risks contributing to a toxic atmosphere of public paranoia and delusion, where rival camps do not merely differ in their interpretation of the facts, but believe in totally different facts altogether. What Turkey urgently needs is a healthy and constructive debate on its Syria policy and how the looming train wreck can be prevented. Permitting an open evaluation of its decisions would only strengthen the AKP government, not weaken it. And, surely, an atmosphere of dialogue and openness is necessary if one hopes to see peace and reconciliation at the end of this “sensitive process.”

A Russian Topol-M missile complex is seen during a military parade to honor the Victory Day at Red Square on May 9, 2013 in Moscow, Russia. Sasha Mordovets/Getty Images

DOHA/ISTANBUL, Asharq Al-Awsat—Gulf sources have downplayed the recent Russian statements concerning a weapons deal with Syria.

A military expert has described reports that Russia has supplied Syria with S-300s missiles as a political maneuver, adding that the intended deal was for Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missiles. The source added that this is a part of an old military deal between the two countries, with Syria acting as the middle-man, and Iran as the final destination.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said last week that Moscow was putting the final touches to hand over defense missiles to Syria.

Lavrov said that Moscow has no new plans to sell a sophisticated air defense system to Syria. However, he left the door open for the likelihood of sending such systems to Damascus in accordance with standing contracts.

The Wall Street Journal reported that the Israeli government informed the United States about an imminent Russian deal to sell anti-aircraft missiles of the 300-S type to the government of Bashar Al-Assad.

Speaking at a press conference in Poland, Lavrov said, “Russia does not intend to sell; Russia actually sold them a long time ago. It signed contracts and is finalizing the operations to hand over the equipment consisting of anti-aircraft technology in accordance with contracts that had been agreed upon.”

Lavrov did not specify whether the equipment being handed over is indeed the sophisticated 300-S systems or another air defense systems.

The Russian minister added that this hand-over is in accordance with international law and that the equipment is designed for defensive purposes only, adding, “As the importing country, the equipment is intended to provide Syria with a system to protect itself from air attacks, which is quite a likely scenario”.

Commenting on the weapons deal, a Gulf official familiar with the Syrian file hoped Russia would reconsider arming the Assad regime, adding, “The Russian stance is perplexing in view of the killing and destruction that the tyrannical Syrian regime is perpetrating. Unfortunately, this stance will impact adversely on Russia’s future interests in Syria and in the region.”

Moreover, an official Turkish source refused to tie the deployment of Western Patriot missiles in Turkey to the Russian missiles deal with Syria. The official said that the goal is to protect Turkish territories from any “stupid actions” that some may contemplate.

The source also stressed that Iran’s concerns regarding Turkey are unjustified. “Although we differ with it, we are determined to keep the relationship with our neighbors at its best level,” the source added.

However, a Turkish strategic expert believes that “everything is possible.” He added that Turkey is waging an indirect war with the Syrian regime in many areas and a cold confrontation with Iran and Russia. He said that economic interests and the concern about a likely war act as a deterrent to prevent sliding into a worse situation in Iran. The expert added that the exposure of Iranian cells in Turkey showed Turkish officials beyond any doubt that Iran is worried about the network of Patriot missiles and that it is doing its best to avert an Israeli or American military strike.

A source in the Syrian armed opposition told Asharq Al-Awsat that the regime did indeed receive Russian missile batteries. He said that training is actually underway for such missile operators, who will be placed at first under the supervision of Russian experts. Iranian experts are also participating in the training. The source added that the information reaching the opposition says that at least one such missile battery has arrived and been installed in the Syrian coastal region. The second batch will be installed in other locations, particularly Damascus.

According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the Pantsir S-1 missiles are among the most advanced air defense systems available, and the deal to sell them goes back to 2006 as part of an arms deal amounting to USD 1 billion. The contract stipulates that the handover should begin in August 2007. According to the US magazine, Iran is the primary sponsor of the Russian deal with Syria and is using Syria as a middle-man to procure the missile system. The arms deal includes 50 missile systems. Iran was set to receive at least 10 of these systems in the beginning of 2008, but the deal was delayed.

Written by Thair Abbas

Lebanon’s Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah. JOSEPH EID/AFP/GettyImages

Of Lebanon’s politicians, Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah stands out for his firebrand orations, which have recently increased in both frequency and intensity. Defying whatever national sentiments the Lebanese might have, Nasrallah has in the past sworn allegiance to Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Nasrallah has openly taken sides with Syria’s embattled dictator, Bashar Al-Assad, and has stuck with his unrelenting threats against Israel.

Nasrallah’s statements count in a country where he has become the most influential man, and where his party, Hezbollah have become the de facto ruling party—even if unofficially. However, despite his amplified cries, Nasrallah’s political chest-thumping rings as hollow as ever. In private, the Hezbollah leader offers conflicting rhetoric on the crisis in Syria.

In a special report published by Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai, Nasrallah was quoted as saying that “Lebanon is crossing into a new phase with its [to be explored] oil and gas,” and that with its estimated fossil fuel fortune, the country “is heading toward prosperity, the improvement of living conditions of its citizens and the upgrading of its infrastructure so that it stands on par with modern nations.”

Nasrallah then contrasts this rosy picture of Lebanon with his prediction of open-ended strife in Syria. The report quotes Nasrallah as saying that there will be “no good outcome” for the conflict in Syria, an idea that echoes the view of Washington and other world capitals and their reasons for staying out of the crisis. The crucial difference is that Nasrallah is actively participating in the conflict by deploying fighters from his formidable militia to Homs suburbs in a bid to tilt the balance in favor of Assad. Yet despite Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, the report suggests that Nasrallah believes that what happens in Syria should stay in Syria.

Two revelations in the report show that Nasrallah’s understanding of the conflict in Syria is skewed on many counts. He believes that the West is still focused on the Middle East’s oil resources, and that the West sponsors conflict in order to create jobs for its “arms factories” and post-war reconstruction companies, both suffering from the recession.

In fact it is in the interest of the West, and China and Japan, to keep Syria’s oil flowing in order to keep the world market price low. This requires stability, not revolutions. However, it is in the interest of Russia and Iran—both oil-producing giants—to take other oil-producing countries, even puny ones like Syria, offline, so that prices can go up, thus increasing their profits.

This scenario does not match the current alignment of Russia and Iran with Assad, who promises both dictatorship and stability, and the West that is pushing for more democracy even at the expense of stability. This means that Nasrallah’s theory on Syria’s oil production, a meager 385,000 barrels per day in 2010, does not compute with the realities of the Syrian crisis.

As for arms production, Russia has long been one of the top nations exporting arms to Syria. Russia’s contracts with Assad dwarf whatever arms the rebels may receive from the West. Nasrallah appears to be unaware that arming civil wars is not rewarding for the West’s military industry, which needs big contracts to turn profits. Such business is possible only with stable governments.

Nasrallah’s amateurish views of world politics and economics explain a lot about why, even though Lebanon is not going to war, it is not moving forward either.

A Free Syrian Army fighter moves with an SPG rocket from one front line to another during ongoing clashes with regime forces on February 28, 2013 in Deir Ezzor. ZAC BAILLIE/AFP/Getty Images

LONDON, Asharq Al-Awsat—The first shipment of US aid reached the Free Syrian Army (FSA) earlier this week, Asharq Al-Awsat has learnt.

Head of the FSA Supreme Military Command, General Salim Idris, was present to oversee the delivery of the new aid. He said: “I hope that this aid will be a first step to be followed by subsequent steps, culminating in our receiving what we need on the battlefield.”

The non-lethal aid, including halal ready meals, medical supplies, and night-vision goggles, was reportedly delivered to the FSA by a US Air Force C-17 cargo plane out of Dover Air Force Base.

This first shipment delivery coincided with US officials revealing that the Department of Defense is studying mechanisms of how the US would arm the Syrian rebels, should president Barack Obama authorize this step.

US sources, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on the condition of anonymity, revealed that these discussions are focusing on the State Department and the CIA. The source revealed that if Washington decides to support the Syrian rebels publicly, it will provide aid openly via the State Department. As for the eventuality that the Obama administration chooses to arm the FSA in secret, this would be done via the CIA.

US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel told a Pentagon press conference yesterday that Washington is “rethinking” policy on directly arming the Syrian rebels.

“Arming the rebels; that’s an option,” Hagel said. Asked directly whether Washington is considering taking this step, he replied: “Yes.” Hagel is the first Obama administration official to publicly acknowledge that the US is considering directly arming the Syrian rebels who are seeking to oust the Assad regime.

Pentagon Press Secretary George Little had earlier revealed that discussions are underway on how to bolster humanitarian assistance to the rebels, and how to engage even more closely with the opposition forces.

He also revealed that the US military is reviewing a range of options for intervention in Syria. “That’s our responsibility and we believe it is important to have options on the shelf to pull off in case the president looks to use to execute those options,” Little said.

Speaking alongside Hagel yesterday, British Defense Minister Philip Hammond emphasized that Britain has “not thus far provided any arms to the rebels, but we have never said it’s something we will not do.”

He added that the British government is concerned with the “legality” of this move, particularly as it is presently subject to an EU ban on supplying arms to any side in Syria.

“We will look at the situation when the ban expires in a few weeks’ time,” he said.

Turkish women stand next to a Turkish flag on November 7, 2006 in Istanbul, Turkey. Yoray Liberman/Getty Images for IHT

Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has not only managed the longest stint in government, it has boosted its popularity along the way. It has won three successive elections, each time with increased support; in the most recent election in 2011, the party received nearly 50% of the vote. These successes have granted the party almost complete dominance of the Turkish political space through appointments to the high courts, the military and the bureaucracy, as well as growing influence over the media, NGOs and the business community.

Owing to the AKP’s roots in the Islamist opposition, a question that often comes up is whether the AKP will use its overbearing authority to Islamize the country, turning it into a Shari’a state. Many of the AKP’s secular opponents point to the party’s cultural policies, from a disdain for alcohol to the promotion of religious education in schools, to suggest that Turkey is on the path to Islamization. Recently, the government instituted optional religion classes for all students, starting in the fifth grade, and it has also cracked down on college campus parties where alcohol is served.

Will Turkey become a Shari’a state?

The answer to this question is, probably, ‘No.’ Turkey’s unique historical and political features make it unfertile ground for Shari’a law or radical Islamization.

To begin, the very concept of Shari’a has long been criminalized in Turkey, and this long-standing criminalization has had the effect of delegitimizing the notion of Shari’a, even among many of Turkey’s most pious Muslims. Political scientist and expert on Turkish Islam Hakan Yavuz elaborates on this in an article entitled Ethical not Shari’a Islam: Islamic Debates in Turkey. Thanks to the Westernization movement that produced the Young Turks and Atatürk (during whose reign “Shari’a” became a dirty word in Turkey), references to this sort of Islamist government have become laden with connotations of the “backward, underdeveloped and fanatical.” Today, the Turkish constitutional court “associates Shari’a with a way of life both religious and backward.”

This sets Turkey apart from Middle Eastern neighbors like Egypt, where all parties, including the secularists, have conceded nominally to Shari’a as a constitutional principle. In Turkey, taking that position is unfathomable. By contrast, in Turkey “Shari’a has a highly pejorative meaning,” according to Yavuz. In the Turkish context, Islamization revolves not around the notion of Shari’a, but rather around an ethical Islam: Islam as an identity marker. In essence, because of the Westernization of Turkey that took root during the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks simply do not “do” jihad or vie for radicalism.

It is therefore not surprising that while 82% of Pakistanis and Egyptians support the implementation of draconian punishments mandated by interpretations of Shari’a law, only 16% of Turks view these measures favorably according to polling by the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project. What is more, this percentage has not increased since the AKP came to power in 2002.

A second barrier to implementing Shari’a is pre-existing and institutionalized Westernization, a feature unique to Turkey among its Muslim neighbors in the Middle East. Essentially, Turkey is so thoroughly Westernized that even the AKP and the rising Islamist elites cannot escape the trappings of their Western mold. From the role of women in society to the country’s membership in the NATO alliance, Turkey’s Western legacy is an ineffable fact. For instance, regardless of how Islamized Turkey becomes, it will be impossible to take women out of the public space. Women’s participation in public life, so deeply engrained in the old secularist Turkey, is also a trademark of the new Turkey. Consider its first lady, Hayrünnisa Gül, the wife of President Abdullah Gül and a former AKP member: she has a very public presence, and runs her own policy initiatives.

Perhaps most importantly, it is Turkey’s embrace of liberal economics that has driven the AKP to the top in the first place. A good part of Turkish influence in the Islamic world is based on its success in the Western world economically and politically, and the somewhat different face of a Muslim population that Turkey’s ‘soft power’ communicates. These characteristics are relayed through mediums such as Turkish soap operas, which depict Turkey as a modern society in which women are empowered.

Turkey’s structural Westernization—its institutional connections to the West and its adoption of Western ways—will also set it apart from other Muslim-majority societies in the region. It is hard to imagine that NATO presence would be so welcome in other Muslim-majority countries, but in Turkey, even the most diehard Islamists had reason to support the NATO Alliance, because it protected Turkey against “godless” communism.

Last but not least, the legacy of constitutionally-mandated secularism, a feature shared only by Tunisia among the Arab countries and a legacy of Kemal Atatürk, will prevent Turkey’s Islamization. Turkey is so thoroughly secularized that even its so-called Islamist leaders think in a secular manner regardless of how pro-religion they may be. Last year, when Prime Minister Erdoğan landed at Cairo’s new airport terminal (which was built by Turkish companies) he was warmly greeted by joyous millions mobilized by the Muslim Brotherhood. However, he soon upset his pious hosts by preaching about the importance of a secular government that provides freedom of religion, using the Turkish word laiklik—derived from laïté, the French word for secularism. In Arabic, this term loosely translates as “irreligious.” Erdoğan’s message may have been partially lost in translation, yet the incident illustrates the stark difference in mindset despite Erdoğan’s pedigree as an Islamist activist in Turkey.

Unintended consequences

All this suggests that Turkey’s Islamization will be tempered by a history that has rendered the very concept of Shari’a an anathema. Still, a threat looms for Turkey: the conflict in Syria.

Since Autumn 2011, when Ankara started to confront the Assad regime and support the rebels, Turkey has employed various means to undermine Assad. To this end, Ankara has been allowing foreign fighters, including jihadists, into Syria in an effort to weaken the Assad regime. This poses grave risks for the country. Jihadists transiting through Turkey will inevitably leave their mark by establishing personal connections and networks, improving logistics skills (such as by opening up bank accounts under false names to fund potential future operations, or obtaining secure communication devices), and proselytizing and recruiting.

There is no guarantee that such jihadists will not target Turkey one day. Al-Qaeda attacked Turkey in 2005, and Turkish police recently uncovered an Al-Qaeda plot to assassinate a number of prominent Turkish public personalities. With so many jihadists traveling through the country and learning the weaknesses of the Turkish security establishment, Ankara is exposed to a real danger: Al-Qaeda could bite the Turkish hand that now allows it into Syria.

When one of the authors of this essay asked Turkish officials if they were concerned about jihadist influence in neighboring Syria, they responded that “Turkish security officials know who these jihadists are and will deal with them accordingly after the fall of the Assad regime.” This could prove to be a tall order for Ankara. The flipside of Turkey not having had a native jihadist problem is that Turkish officials have little experience in dealing with jihadist groups. In other words, while Ankara thinks it is taking advantage of the jihadists, in fact the jihadists could be taking advantage of Turkey. Given the fact that the Turkish–Syrian border has become increasingly porous since 2011, Turkey might find itself with a jihadist problem on the border it shares with Syria, where Al-Qaeda affiliates have made significant gains in recent months. Turkey may still fall unwittingly into Al-Qaeda’s cross-hairs in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime.

Nations are subject to change, sometimes swiftly and dramatically. And so, of course, any sweeping conclusions about Turkey’s destiny come with a bold caveat. Nevertheless, Turkey’s unique combination of Islamic world and Western influence is likely to serve as a compass for the future, regardless of specific changes in one or another direction. This combination is hard-wired into both individuals and institutions, and it produces measurable results. Conversely, a Turkey that turns it back to either of its main sources of national personality will open the door to internal strife, forfeit its allure for the industrialized world, and for its Middle Eastern neighbors, and encounter difficulties sustaining its extraordinary social political development, economic rise, and diplomatic success.

Lebanese Hezbollah supporters hold a picture of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (L), Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) and his late father president Hafez al-Assad (C) in Bint Jbeil on September 22, 2012. MAHMOUD ZAYYAT/AFP/GettyImages

In an open letter, Syrian opposition figure, Moaz Al-Khatib, called on Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah to withdraw his fighters to avoid the conflict degenerating into a sectarian war.

“Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria has complicated matters deeply, and I expected you, given your political and social stature, to play a more positive role” Khatib said in a statement posted on Facebook.

Khatib, a moderate Sunni who has widespread support in Syria, made his appeal just two days after radical Sunni Sheikh Ahmad Al-Assir called for Lebanese fighters to join insurgents seeking to oust Assad.

But the main rebel group, the Free Syrian Army, rejected the call to jihad in a statement Wednesday.

The Iran-backed Hezbollah movement, a close ally of the Assad regime, has denied accusations that it has sent its elite troops into Syria to support regime forces.

It says Syrian rebels have targeted Shi’a areas of Syria inhabited by Lebanese adding that the Shi’as in Syria have a right to self-defense.

But the accusations against Hezbollah have multiplied as fighting escalated this week in the Qusayr area near the Lebanon border.

In a related development, the Al-Nusra Front issued an ultimatum to Lebanese president Michel Suleiman yesterday to withdraw Hezbollah forces from Syria or Beirut will be attacked.

In a statement carried on a number of jihadist websites, the Al-Qaeda affiliated group said, “He must take immediate measures to prevent Hezbollah interference in the internal affairs of Syria, or Beirut will be set on fire within the next 24 hours.”

Yesterday, the United Nations political chief said that rapid action was needed to address the Syrian crisis.

“As the situation inside Syria continues to deteriorate, it is even more vital that everyone collectively work towards preserving regional stability,” Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs said in a briefing to the UN Security Council.

“Now is the time for the international community to work in a concerted manner and without delay,” Mr. Feltman said, recalling that Arab leaders at the recent Doha Summit had reconfirmed their intention to send a ministerial delegation to Washington, D.C. on April 28 to discuss the peace process.

According to UN figures the conflict in Syria has already left more than 70,000 people dead since it began in March 2011.

Mor Gregorios Yohanna Ibrahim

Ibrahim is an ordinary man—an ordinary man who believes wholeheartedly in the message that he promotes tirelessly, one of tolerance and unity. Ibrahim is also an advocate of dialogue. At the time of the meeting, in early December, he was optimistic for the newly formed Syrian coalition.

Whoever carried it out, the senseless kidnapping at gunpoint of Ibrahim and the Greek Orthodox Archbishop Boulos Yaziji in the village of Kafr Dael on the outskirts of Aleppo on Monday evening has hit Syria’s Christian community hard. During the country’s chaotic descent into violence, they have leaned heavily on their religious leaders for guidance, strength and assistance due to concern over the future of their community in Syria. False reports circulated by major global news channels that the bishops had been released Tuesday night, has only compounded their turmoil.

In December, Bishop Ibrahim spoke of the rising spate of kidnappings in the city of Aleppo—a devastating development in the city that has been little acknowledged in the Western media. When captured, the bishops were reportedly on a humanitarian mission to release two priests who were kidnapped months ago by an unknown gang. Many Aleppine families, at home or in the diaspora community, have experienced the inexplicable disappearance of at least one relative or former neighbor. Most have never learned the fate of their loved ones. Bishop Ibrahim said he had heard of hundreds of such cases, and in his capacity as a community leader would go from neighborhood to neighborhood offering solace to the families.

The humanitarian work that Ibrahim was undertaking when he was captured was to an extent just another working day. His work required him to travel across Syria as well as around the world frequently. In recent times, this had put him, and others who carried out similar work, in constant threat of danger, although he did not seem fearful and carried out his business as usual.

Ibrahim and Yaziji’s kidnapping could mark a turning point for Syria’s civil war in terms of the treatment of the country’s Christians. The abduction of the men and killing of their driver, who was Ibrahim’s deacon, marks the first time such senior Christian figures have been targeted in Syria’s civil war. Significantly, Boulos Yaziji’s brother is the recently enthroned John Yaziji, who leads the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All The East, the largest Arab Christian Church in the Middle East. If it should transpire that the kidnappers were affiliated with a known rebel group, it could seriously hurt the reputation of the opposition movement.

There was widespread condemnation of the kidnapping from Lebanon’s Sunni and Shi’ite religious leaders, including the grand mufti, Sheikh Mohammad Rashid Qabbani, who said, “We denounce [acts] that harm any religious authority figure regardless to which sect he belongs.” George Sabra, who was assigned on Monday as the interim head of the Syrian National Coalition, is reportedly working to secure the release of the bishops.

The Antiochian Chritian Orthodox Diocese issued a statement on Tuesday saying that their release had not yet taken place. Members of the community close to Ibrahim stress that no contact has yet been made with the bishops or with the kidnappers.

Ibrahim is an ordinary man. Yet there is something extraordinary about how he has been facing the crisis in his homeland. There remains an unwavering optimism in his perspective on the conflict. On that wintry day in London five months ago Ibrahim ended the conversation on a hopeful note, “as a man of God or as a religious leader I see that still at the end of this tunnel there is light.”

Syrian Christians worldwide are now asking for signatures on a petition that urges the US government’s participation in efforts to release the bishops. You can sign the petition HERE.

Grace Perriman contributed reporting

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Zuheir Salem. TAM HUSSEIN

Such secrecy is hardly surprising, considering that the SMB were wiped out by Hafez Al-Assad in the 1980s. They are set to make a comeback. Zuheir Salem himself appears to be more like an academic than a back-room dealer. Salem has been a Brotherhood member since the age of fifteen, and comes from a respected and religiously conservative family from Aleppo. His membership in the Brotherhood resulted in exile, which took him across the Middle East and Europe. Only now, after forty years, has he received refugee status. Although he is a prolific commentator in the Arab media, he has received surprisingly little attention from the Western media. One wonders why the Western media, who worry much about the influence of the Syrian Brotherhood in a post-Assad Syria, do not just pick up the telephone and speak to a man who is only around the corner.

The Majalla: Is the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood happy with the appointment of Ghassan Hitto?

Zuheir Salem: There were a lot of candidates to start with, but we narrowed them down to a few. Of course, the opposition tried to agree on one candidate, but that was difficult. There were two factions who were insisting on supporting their respective candidates. Mr. Ghassan Hitto was fortunate to be chosen. The SMB had said that they would support the candidate who received the most votes. Since Ghassan Hitto had the most votes, we gave him our support—not because he was our preferred candidate.

Q: What do you make of Moaz Al-Khatib’s resignation?

Khatib is not from a political background; he is a religious man, an engineer by profession and a man of integrity. The resignation is to do with lack of political experience, but also due to the feeling of responsibility for all the deaths in Syria, especially as he cannot do anything about it and the world isn’t helping. In such a situation, it is easy to say to oneself, ‘If I was outside of this framework, perhaps I could do more.’ I don’t mean this to be a criticism, but rather as a description of his current state.

Q: How do you see the killing of Sheikh Ramadan Bouti?

We simply don’t know what happened, but you could make an educated guess. I don’t consider the sheikh a hypocrite, but I criticize his political position. This has caused a lot of suffering to those who followed him. No one from the opposition has claimed responsibility for his death—even the radicals have not claimed it as their doing. The Jubhat Al-Nusra [Al-Nusra Front] have denied any involvement. They usually claim responsibility for anything that they do, but they have not.

Instead, it seems that the regime has been stoking the propaganda machine to create this fear of terrorism. I believe that the person who killed him was Bashar Al-Assad. The regime has a precedent of killing its friends, including Mahmud Al-Zobi, Ghazi Kanaan, Mugniyeh, [and] Muhammad Suleiman. Whilst this is speculation, the regime has an interest in Buti’s killing; perhaps it wants to convince the international community that there really are extremists in their midst who are now in control.

Q: Do the differences among the opposition indicate political inexperience, or is it just a natural consequence of civil society returning?

These differences have two points. The first is that it is quite a natural thing to happen. The second point is that the opposition came about from an absence of political life. For fifty years, there has been no political opposition party except for the Muslim Brotherhood. Currently, there is a lack of political organization that can unite these personalities into coherent parties, and that makes communication and dialogue difficult.

Q: From your perspective, is the Al-Nusra Front extremist?

Relatively speaking, I believe the maximum following they have is probably seven thousand people. Generally we have not seen political or military excesses from these groups, which we have seen in Iraq or Afghanistan. The opposition was right not to agree with the Americans designating them a terrorist group. I believe that they came about as a result of the regime sending them to Iraq; those who returned were arrested. This new organization was started by the Syrian people, because they didn’t find those who would support them financially. When the Syrians went to the West asking for help, they were rejected. They went to the Arab world, asking for help and no help was forthcoming. So some who were linked with various organizations—and I do not know who they are—supported them. Those who are with them are not with them ideologically, but rather because they can protect themselves.

Q: Do you think the West can communicate with the Al-Nusra Front?

First, we want the West to understand our society. It is possible to communicate with these groups. But there is a need to approach the problem without an ideological agenda that can accept other viewpoints. I am not defending Al-Qaeda in terms of their ideology; movements that destroy and kill are rejected in Islam. But the Western approach is imprisoned by an ideological framework. There is a dislike of Islamic civilization, as has been expounded in works such as The Clash of Civilizations. There has to be respect and humility when discussing with opposition groups.

Q: What does the SMB envision for Syria after the fall of the Assad regime?

Everyone should be a citizen in Syria. The West looks at religious states through the prism of Western civilization, and political terminology needs to be understood in its context. The understanding of faith and religion differ with each respective civilization. We want a civil state and not a theocratic one, because Islam does not have a clergy that runs the state in the first place. For us, religion is a framework that does not enter into the details; the rules of religion with respect to the public law [make up] only five percent [of all rules]. The rest of it pertains to the private individuals’ conduct in the Shari’a. For us, the Shari’a is about the interest decided by the governed. We will not bring laws which are not agreed on by the citizens; Shari’a can be expressed within the framework of democracy. So if we say that extra-marital relationships are forbidden and [it is] agreed on in parliament, we will go with it; if it is rejected, we will not. This is what we mean by a civil government.

Q: What about accommodating the minorities?

The issue of minorities is exaggerated. In Syria, we have always accommodated minorities; we celebrate Christian Easter [and] Christmas, and the Eids all are all public holidays. In the UK, Eid is not a public holiday. In fact, I don’t expect it to be so in the UK. It is the present government that created this sectarianism. Syria is not Iraq, nor is it Lebanon. The Sunni majority have lived side by side and worked together with the minorities. This is also why we must use the term “citizen,” and not Sunni, Christian and Alawite. If we use this term, then sectarianism can be forgotten. Similarly, we cannot have a minority ruling the majority—how would the West accept that in their own countries?

Q: Who should represent Syrians currently?

Many pro-Western Syrians come to West and talk as if they represent Syrians. They talk as if Syria will become a part of France or Britain, but they don’t really have much of a following in Syria. The truth is that the people here are religious and they follow religious people, like Moaz Al-Khatib, who are trustworthy. Now we have to find someone who can understand the West and Syrian people. They have to be a bridge between the two. The Ulema [religious scholars] do have a positive role in hemming in the anger in Syrian society, especially in the villages.

Q: What is the difference between the SMB and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood?

From an ideological perspective, there is not a big difference between us and them, but we are separate organizations. The leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood does not rule over all the groups. Now, for instance, I am criticizing Mursi—and maybe they are upset with me for that—but the relationship is still one which is based on love and desire for the same objective.

Where we differ is in our policies. For example, Egypt wants to have a fatwa council, which Al-Azhar approves; we don’t want that. We say that what is permissible and what is forbidden is clear. We don’t want to enter the realm of theocracy. Syrian society is different from Egyptian society. The political experience in Egypt is different from ours, and I believe personally that the Egyptian Brotherhood made a tactical mistake. Egypt was a sinking ship, and you can’t come and change it in the way that you are doing. I believe that we have to work within a coalition. I think that Aboul-Fotouh would probably have been a better choice. This is why they are in a difficult position now. There are also outside powers who want to see the Muslim Brotherhood fail. They don’t want to see something like Turkey.

Q: What are some of the difficulties the Syrian opposition is facing?

Our five people represent 5000 others, but if you asked other candidates who they represent, they will reply that they represent themselves. This lack of political organization makes communication and dialogue difficult. Many personalities are also idealistic and may not necessarily be realists. Sometimes they represent an idea over the practical issues of party politics. You cannot create a political party with them, except [if] you create a party and give them leadership or an executive role. Forming an executive is difficult because inevitably you have to leave some in and exclude others. This, of course, causes some resentment among the excluded. If there had been a strong political organization this would not have been a problem, since this is quite natural in political life.

Q: Why are you only helping groups affiliated with the Syrian Brotherhood?

This is not correct. We do not put this as a condition for rendering help. People think wrongly that the SMB has money, and we simply don’t have it. There are also other reasons: before giving money, we need to establish who they are. There are a lot of armed groups who may use weapons or things that are against their own compatriots in brigandage, and so on. We need to establish their credentials before giving [help] to them. Same thing with aid: before distributing it, there has to be the infrastructure in place in order to deliver this aid.

Q: There are media outlets that have reported that there are some Free Syrian Army Brigades linked to you. Can you confirm this?

British press coverage has served the Assad regime. We believe that there are some parties who have vested political interests, like the Syrian pro-regime lobby working against the revolution. We have approached the left in Britain and they say we are with the USA; when we go to the US they say we are with the Al-Nusra Front; when we go to the Turkish opposition they say we are with Qatar. All of them are playing with the human rights of Syrian people. If Assad stays, you will see Europe flooded with 15 million Syrian refugees. We have found the British media to be contradictory, and the position of the British government is far more advanced than the British press; the American press coverage is better in this regard.

Q: If Assad left for Russia tomorrow, would the conflict end?

Yes, if Assad and his group went and the war ended, we [could] set up national dialogue and re-establish trust in order for Syria to reconcile.

Q: What is your opinion of Iran?

Iran is part of the region and they have an important role to play. When the Iranian Revolution happened, we thought it was a good thing. However, we wish that the Iranian revolution—especially in a globalized world—worked within a human rights framework, as opposed to sectarian one. Iran has currently taken the wrong position. Iran needs to work hard to repair its relationship with the Arab world because of their current position.

If you asked me five years ago if I had any issues about them having nuclear weapons, I would have said no and would have defended their right to do so. But now I am worried, because we will be hemmed in by two nuclear powers: Israel on one side and Iran on the other. Unfortunately, they are the ones who created this situation. I don’t want them to become a nuclear power after seeing how they have behaved. I have come to believe that Iran has become a strategic danger; at the same time, we don’t want to make Iran out as the eternal enemy.

Q: What is the SMB’s position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict?

We support Palestinian rights wholeheartedly. It does not mean that once we are in power we will marshal the horses and get ready the soldiers of God. Far from it. The Egyptian Brotherhood ratified the Camp David Accords without backing down on their support for the Palestinian people. We believe that there is international law, which has already designated Israel a pariah state, and we will support the Palestinian cause through these means.

Rebels fighters prepare to fire a portable canon against an adjacent Syrian government-held building during fighting on February 27, 201 in Deir Ezzor. Source: ZAC BAILLIE/AFP/Getty Images

London, Asharq Al-Awsat—There were over 6,000 documented deaths in Syria last month, making it the bloodiest month in its 2 year uprising, according to figures released by the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
However, Rami Abdul-Rahman, who heads the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, said the increased toll is likely incomplete because both the Syrian army and the rebel groups often under-report their dead in the civil war.

“Both sides are hiding information,” Abdul-Rahman told the Associated Press. “It is very difficult to get correct info on the fighters because they don’t want the information to hurt morale.”

As in previous months, around a third of those killed in March were civilians, the Observatory said. Almost 300 children died, taking the number killed in the conflict to around 4,390. The United Nations says more than 70,000 people have died in Syria.

In other news, a group of Syrian oppositionists announced over the weekend the establishment of a new revolutionary group called “The Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Syria.”

Luay al-Zu’bi, a Syrian oppositionist and member of the new front, said that the group was established to repel a number of plots that are in the way of the Syrian revolution, which aims to hijack it from the Syrian people.

The front is made up of several movements opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, among them the “Believers Participate”, the “Unified Syrian Bloc”, led by Wahid Saqr (Alawite oppositionist), the “Revolutionary Forces for the Liberation of Syria Grouping” which is led by dissident Major General Muhammad al-Haj Ali, the “Democratic National Bloc”, the “Arab Tribes Council”, and the “Field Representation Bureau.”

While leadership sources in the Free Syrian Army [FSA] denied any knowledge of the front’s establishment, other sources in the FSA told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group does not differ from the other attempts by Syrian oppositionists to establish political blocs and denied that there is any contact or coordination with the FSA.

Fahd al-Masri, the FSA’s official in the Joint Command’s central media department, told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the FSA does not interfere in the political action and we do not consider the establishment of several trends opposed to the regime unhealthy but the natural result of the absence of democratic life in Syria for four decades.” He pointed out that “there are in the new front nationalist figures that we respect as we respect the other Syrian opposition spectrum.” He noted at the same time that “the political opposition’s performance has not yet risen to the level of the sacrifices that the Syrian people are making.”